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Social Psychology 
and Neuroscience: Strange 
Bedfellows or a Healthy Marriage?
John F. Dovidio, Adam R. Pearson and Patrick Orr
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In this paper, we assess what neuroscience theory and method have contributed to the study 
of group processes and intergroup relations and what we see as potential future contributions 
to the discipline. We briefl y review the historical relation between neuroscience and social 
psychology, identify issues that may limit the value of neuroscience to the study of group 
processes and relations, and then argue that social neuroscience indeed holds signifi cant 
promise for understanding many key elements of group processes and intergroup relations. 
Both the potential problems and the potential benefi ts of bridging neuroscience and social 
psychology are considered in terms of theoretical considerations, empirical issues, and practical 
implications. We conclude that, although not all group phenomena may be reducible to 
neural activity and pathways, there are signifi cant benefi ts to social psychology by having an 
even broader multidisciplinary orientation within social psychology, one that incorporates the 
complementary perspectives, techniques, and knowledge of neuroscience. 
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Social neuroscience, as this Special Issue of 
GPIR attests, is clearly one of the ‘hot’ areas 
of interest in social psychology today. In 2002, 
John Cacioppo and 11 co-editors published a 
seminal volume, Foundations of Social Neuroscience. 
In 2003, the Attitudes and Social Cognition 
section of the Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, a premier journal in social psychology, 
had a ‘special section’ on social neuroscience. 
The value of bridging social psychology and 
neuroscience was similarly recognized by neuro-
scientists. In 2003, Neuropsychologia dedicated 
a special issue to ‘The Cognitive Neuroscience of 
Social Behavior,’ in 2004 the Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience sponsored a special issue on social 
cognitive neuroscience. In recent years, several 
psychology departments have incorporated 
‘brain sciences’ into their designations. Also, 
work in social neuroscience has garnered an 
increasing share of federal grant budgets in 
recent years, and interest in the fi eld has spawned 
new journals, such as Social Cognitive and Affective 
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Neuroscience and Social Neuroscience (both fi rst 
published in 2006). 
There is general consensus that the integra-
tion of neuroscience and social psychology holds 
unique promise. Heatherton (2004), in his 
introduction to the special issue on social cog-
nitive neuroscience in the Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience wrote, ‘The neuroscientifi c study of 
social cognition refl ects a new interdisciplinary 
and dynamic approach that is providing crucial 
insights into longstanding social psychological 
questions’ (p. 1681). The scholarly momentum 
of recent years appears to indicate a new era of 
exceptional potential and excitement. 
However, progress in integrating neuroscience 
into mainstream social psychology has been 
notably slow. Even with special issues of journals, 
the number of published studies in primary 
social psychology outlets (e.g. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, and other more specialized journals, 
such as Group Processes and Intergroup Relations 
and Social Cognition) incorporating neuroimag-
ing data, particularly those using functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) or event related 
potential techniques, have rarely exceeded a half 
dozen in a single year. 
Some reasons for their slow integration 
may relate simply to practical considerations 
associated with the editorial process itself. In 
social psychology, the initial review process 
takes three months or more, several rounds of 
revision may be required, and publication lags 
are frequently over a year long. In a rapidly 
developing fi eld, such as social neuroscience, 
timeliness of communication is critical, and 
neuroscience journals may often pose as more 
attractive outlets for those concerned about ex-
pediency in the dissemination of their work. In 
addition, the bias toward more programmatic 
research within some mainstream social psy-
chology outlets, encouraging multiple instan-
tiations of processes and theory, may often 
discourage researchers from pursuing more 
resource-intensive neuroscience methods. 
However, other reasons for the paucity of 
social neuroscience papers in mainstream 
social psychology journals may relate to more 
substantive scientifi c issues, such as traditionally 
differing interests and foci of neuroscientists 
and social psychologists in more descriptive (e.g. 
functional characterization of neural processes) 
and theory-driven approaches. 
In this article, we explore some potential rea-
sons for the estrangement of neuroscience and 
social psychology, in our assessment both justi-
fi ed and unjustifi ed, and examine the relation-
ship between neuroscience and social psychology 
from a social psychological perspective. Specifi c-
ally, we assess what neuroscience theory and 
method have contributed to the study of group 
processes and intergroup relations and what 
we see as potential future contributions to the 
discipline. Our perspective is admittedly, and 
intentionally, a social psychological one. That 
is, even while recognizing the potential benefi ts 
of understanding social psychological theories 
and problems for neuroscience, the question we 
ask is whether and how neuroscience benefi ts 
social psychology, in general, and the study of 
group and intergroup processes in particular. 
Our analysis is not intended to be encyclo-
pedic or fully defi nitive. Our goal is to stimulate 
thought and discussion, and we make a limited 
number of points with specific illustrative 
examples. We fi rst briefl y review the historical 
relation between neuroscience and social psy-
chology. We next identify issues that may limit 
the value of neuroscience to the study of group 
processes and relations. We then argue that social 
neuroscience indeed holds signifi cant promise 
for understanding many social psychological 
phenomena, and we discuss this potential for 
the future.
Historical relations between social 
psychology and neuroscience
Over the past 50 years, there has been a system-
atic shift within social psychology from studying 
behavior at more molar levels of analysis to more 
molecular levels. In a stimulating analysis of 
trends in social psychology, Steiner (1974) asked 
in the title of his article, ‘Whatever happened 
to the group in social psychology?’ Social 
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psychology, which was dominated by research 
in the United States, had systematically shifted 
its emphasis to more molecular units of analysis. 
Steiner noted that ‘for a decade following World 
War II social psychologists tended to view the 
individual as an element in a larger system. 
Research on small groups prospered…. But 
by the 1960s social psychology had become 
much more individualistic…. [R]esearch was 
focused on intra-individual events or processes 
that mediate responses to social situations’ 
(p. 94). 
Soon after Steiner’s paper, in the mid-1970s, 
this trend became even stronger, with even 
greater attention devoted to individual and 
intra-individual level processes. Social cog-
nition became a dominant theme in social psy-
chology. The social cognition movement bor-
rowed many techniques (e.g. response time 
measures) from cognitive psychology and 
applied the general perspective and specifi c 
theories of cognitive psychology to study 
traditional social psychological processes. 
Gilbert (1999) explains, ‘The social cognitive 
movement was characterized by … its allegiance 
to the information processing metaphor, which 
suggested that mental phenomena are pro-
perly explained by describing a sequence of 
hypothetical operations and structures that 
might produce them’ (p. 777). Once social psy-
chologists became interested in such low-level, 
intra-individual phenomena as information 
processing, memory, and implicit cognition, 
more serious attention began to be paid by social 
psychologists to brain structure and function. 
In recent years, thanks largely to advances in 
computational and methodological approaches 
for studying neural systems, the fi elds of neuro-
biology and psychology saw the emergence of 
neuroscience as an independent fi eld bridg-
ing interests in a number of disciplines. The 
brain represented a fundamental area of com-
mon ground for both neurobiologists and psy-
chologists, and neuroscience has produced many 
unique insights. However, these insights were 
limited in focus, and many of the phenomena 
that are so central to social psychology were 
excluded from consideration. Cacioppo et al. 
(2007) observed, ‘There have been important 
advances in our understanding of the links 
between mind, brain, and behavior over the 
past century, but it has been conventional to 
conceptualize individuals as somewhat isolated 
units of analysis …. To the extent that social 
factors were suspected of being relevant, their 
consideration would so complicate the study 
of brain and behavior that they were not a 
priority’ (p. 100).
This state of affairs began to change in the 
1990s with the emergence of social neuroscience. 
Social neuroscience is ‘an interdisciplinary fi eld 
devoted to understanding how biological systems 
implement social processes and behavior, cap-
italizing on biological concepts and methods to 
inform and refi ne theories of social processes 
and behavior, and using social and behavioral 
concepts and data to refi ne theories of neural 
organization and function’ (Cacioppo et al., 
2007, p. 100). Indeed, social neuroscience may 
be particularly promising precisely because it 
represents a convergence of research interests 
that have been pursued largely in parallel and 
with little conversation or cross-pollination. 
While being supportive of this timely and 
important new interdisciplinary movement, 
in the present article we aim to take stock of 
the implications of neuroscience for social 
psychology. We believe that it is important to 
consider the problems as well as the promise 
of neuroscience, particularly for those areas of 
social psychology related to group processes 
and intergroup relations. Our focus will be 
on brain processes, with an emphasis on fMRI 
research to illustrate many of our points. We 
fi rst offer a critique of the use of neuroimaging 
data for the study of group processes and inter-
group relations. We then shift our analysis by 
highlighting what we see as some points of 
considerable promise of social neuroscience 
for advancing social psychological knowledge 
within the domain of intergroup psychology. 
Our appraisal is an intentionally critical (and 
perhaps controversial) one, aimed at encour-
aging a greater, albeit more critical, collab-
orative and integrative effort among the 
disciplines.
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Concerns about a social neuroscience 
approach for social psychology
There are many reasons to be concerned about 
the impact of neuroscience on social psycho-
logical research. In this section we consider 
theoretical, empirical, and pragmatic bases of 
concern.
Theoretical perspectives on social behavior 
One general issue is that although neuroscience 
may be very useful to social psychology at some 
levels of analysis (e.g. social cognition), trying to 
reduce other types of complex social phenomena 
to specifi c brain structures and processes may 
not be helpful and may distract researchers 
from pursuing more molar explanations for 
social behavior. We are not the fi rst to suggest 
this point. Harmon-Jones and Devine (2003) 
cautioned that ‘some issues and phenomena 
examined by social psychologists may not be 
reducible to a neuroscience (and hence more 
molecular) level of analysis’ (p. 590). 
One of the unique aspects of social psych-
ology, in general, and the study of intergroup 
relations, in particular, is the scope of its per-
spective (Pettigrew, 1988). Understanding inter-
group relations involves recognition of struc-
tural, situational, individual, and intra-individual 
processes. Whereas intra-individual-, individual-, 
and situational-level processes may benefi t dir-
ectly from techniques in social neuroscience, the 
relevance of social neuroscience to structural 
theories of intergroup behavior is much less 
clear. For instance, intergroup inequities in 
power and infl uence between Whites and Blacks 
are perpetuated through institutional discrim-
ination, in which laws, policies, and institutional 
practices favor Whites over Blacks in ways that are 
often subtle and unrecognized (Feagin, 2006). 
Structural forces have similarly been implicated 
in the maintenance of inequality across a number 
of other domains of group life (Jost, Burgess, & 
Mosso, 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Social neuro-
science may help illuminate intra-individual 
processes refl ecting and contributing to inter-
group bias, but such fi ndings cannot supplant 
investigations at more macro-levels of analysis, 
such as the role of system-level forces in shaping 
intergroup relations. Moreover, too narrow a 
focus on intra-individual processes can distract 
social psychologists from the critical impact 
of more macro-level processes associated with 
social structure. 
Empirical perspectives 
Empirically, social neuroscience is seductive. 
It is able to convey a sense of knowledge in a 
powerful way. As social psychologists have long 
known, the authority and credibility of the 
source of a message substantially infl uences 
the impact of a message (Aronson, Turner, & 
Carlsmith, 1963). Medicine and the biological 
sciences have traditionally been seen as more 
prestigious and authoritative than the social 
and behavioral sciences (Kanekar, 1990). 
Moreover, the results of neuroscience studies, 
which are often concretely illustrated with 
brain images, are more effective, particularly 
for an audience beyond the profession, at com-
municating key fi ndings than are the statistical 
analyses and means that are typically represented 
in social psychological research (Dovidio & 
Gaertner, 2007). Indeed, a recent series of studies 
by Weisberg and colleagues (Weisberg, Keil, 
Goodstein, Rawson, & Gray, 2008). Illustrates 
well what they describe as the ‘seductive allure’ 
of neuroscience data. When given brief descrip-
tions of psychological phenomena followed 
by logically irrelevant neuroscience results or 
no neuroscience results, both naive adults and 
students in a neuroscience course judged that 
explanations with logically irrelevant neuro-
science information were more satisfying than 
explanations without such information. Notably, 
this bias was found to be particularly strong 
when the information was coupled with a bad 
explanation; for novices and neuroscience stu-
dents alike, neuroscience data seemed to mask 
otherwise salient logical inconsistencies in the 
arguments presented. 
In their analysis of these fi ndings, the authors 
argued that people may be more generally biased 
toward favoring a reductionist framework when 
confronted with explanatory information, add-
ing: ‘The mere mention of a lower level of analysis 
may have made the bad behavioral explanations 
seem connected to a larger explanatory system, 
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and hence more insightful. If this is the case, other 
types of logically irrelevant information that 
tap into a general reductionist framework could 
encourage people to judge a wide variety of poor 
explanations as satisfying’ (p. 476). The danger 
of such a reductionism bias is particularly evi-
dent when considering social neuroscientifi c 
fi ndings that, by nature, present both lower 
and higher level (i.e. neural and behavioral) 
accounts within the same study. Such presenta-
tions may leave readers with the potentially 
false impression that they are extracting more 
‘scientifi c’ information from the inclusion of 
lower level data. Minimally, such a bias may 
both refl ect and promote a tendency to unduly 
privilege one level of analysis over another, 
the theoretical, methodological, and practical 
consequences of which we discuss in subsequent 
sections. As others have cogently argued (see 
Cacciopo et al., 2003), it is thus important that 
researchers and audiences alike hold neuro-
science and behavioral data to the same statistical 
and interpretational standards.
The inherent allure of neuroscience data 
poses another more fundamental challenge to 
behavioral researchers. From the specifi c per-
spective of social psychology, neuroimaging 
results may sometimes add little new information 
beyond the insights that can be gleaned from 
purely behavioral data. In 2003, for instance, 
Richeson and Shelton published a study in 
Psychological Science, ‘When Prejudice Does Not 
Pay: Effects of Interracial Contact on Executive 
Function’. This research, which investigated 
intergroup interactions, was conducted using 
traditional social psychological methods. White 
participants, who had previously been tested 
for level of implicit prejudice on the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998), had a brief interaction with 
either a White or a Black confederate. After the 
interaction, the participants performed a Stroop 
(1935) Color-Naming task in which they were 
asked to responded to the text color in which a 
stimulus word appeared, independent of the 
semantic meaning of the word, with the reaction 
time to incompatible trials (e.g. the word ‘yellow’ 
in blue text) refl ecting response inhibition, 
or ‘executive attentional capacity’. The key 
prediction made by the researchers was that the 
cognitive demands of interracial interaction, 
as compared to intraracial interaction, would 
impair Whites’ subsequent performance on 
the Stroop task. 
The study was theoretically elegant, required 
only common laboratory equipment (a personal 
computer with a button-box interface), and 
produced supportive results. In addition, as 
expected, the interference on the Stroop task 
was greater for White participants higher in 
implicit prejudice. Further, in a subsequent 
study, Richeson, Trawalter, and Shelton (2005) 
replicated these results for Black subjects in 
interracial and intraracial interactions.
Around the same time, Richeson and col-
leagues (Richeson et al., 2003), published 
another paper, ‘An fMRI Investigation of the 
Impact of Intererracial Contact Executive 
Function,’ in Nature Neuroscience. This study em-
ployed sophisticated fMRI technology, but this 
technology required a fundamental change in 
procedure. Richeson et al. explain, ‘Because it is 
not yet feasible to measure brain activity during 
actual face-to-face interaction, we used fMRI to 
assess neural activity in response to photographs 
of unfamiliar black faces as a proxy’. The results 
obtained were as predicted. Implicit prejudice 
predicted subsequent impaired performance 
on a Stroop task after viewing Black faces, and 
this effect was mediated by activity in the right 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, a brain region 
hypothesized to be critical to executive function. 
The authors concluded, ‘These results are 
consistent with a resource depletion account 
of the temporary executive dysfunction seen 
in racially biased individuals after interracial 
contact’ (p. 1323). 
This is another elegant study with interesting 
results. However, the question we pose is this, 
from the perspective of social psychology, how infor-
mative is the information about mediation by 
right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activation 
for understanding intergroup relations, particu-
larly when pictures are substituted for actual 
interracial interaction? Passive viewing of faces 
can elicit a number of different psychological 
responses (e.g. efforts at controlling particular 
responses and/or anxious rumination about 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(2)
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appearing prejudiced to the experimenters), 
and the nature of the response is diffi cult to 
determine without a behavioral task to validate 
the interpretation. We defi nitely feel that re-
search of this type is valuable, and frequently 
cite these fi ndings in our own research. We 
acknowledge that the fMRI results are in may 
ways titillating, and the fi ndings may be very 
important from a neuroscience perspective, but 
do the expense of brain imaging and the ne-
cessary shift away from the mundane realism 
of actual interaction enhance the bottom-line 
conclusion (obtained with the classic Stroop 
procedure) of primary relevance to intergroup 
researchers that interracial interactions deplete 
the cognitive resources of both White and Black 
participants? There is probably no correct or 
consensual answer to this question, but it is one 
that we believe needs to be asked by researchers 
who study group processes and intergroup 
relations. 
Interpretations of social neuroscience fi ndings
Even when we answer the question we posed 
affi rmatively, instantiating the incremental value 
of underlying brain activity for understanding 
particular questions about group processes and 
intergroup relations, social psychology has to 
be wary of the tendency to over-interpret social 
neuroscience fi ndings because of unfamiliarity 
with the measures or enthusiasm to embrace 
convergent ‘scientifi c’ fi ndings. 
Again we will illustrate this with a particular 
example. As a result of the growing popularity of 
functional neuroimaging, many studies focused 
on implicit and explicit reactions to racial sti-
muli have utilized neuroimaging techniques 
(Eberhardt, 2005; Phelps & Thomas, 2003) in 
concert with the IAT. The most popular target for 
neuroimaging studies looking for a neural basis 
for implicit attitudes is, by far, the amygdala. 
Many studies have investigated the neural re-
sponse to viewing Black and White faces and 
performance on the IAT with a focus on changes 
in amygdala activation, and have begun to form a 
picture of the neural basis for implicit attitudes. 
A general conclusion often taken from this 
research is that amygdala activation is greater 
when people view members of another race 
than their own race, and that this activation is 
greater among people with more negative im-
plicit racial attitudes (as measured by the IAT) 
(Dovidio, Kawakami, Smoak, & Gaertner, in 
press); Wheeler & Fiske, 2005). 
An examination of the actual studies on 
which this conclusion is generally based reveals 
a less consistent empirical picture. In one of 
the fi rst imaging studies to examine responses 
to viewing other-race faces (Hart et al., 2000), 
during the first presentation and scan, no 
differences in amygdala activation were found in 
response to racial ingroup and outgroup faces. 
During the second presentation and scan, 
participants generally responded with greater 
amygdala activation while viewing faces of the 
racial outgroup relative to the ingroup (White 
faces for Blacks, and Black faces for Whites), 
but this difference was the result of a decrease, 
or habituation, of the amygdala response to 
ingroup faces. 
With respect to the relationship between im-
plicit prejudice and amygdala activation, Phelps 
and colleagues (2000) found a correlation for 
White participants between amygdala activation 
while viewing unfamiliar Black-versus-White faces 
and IAT responses, but they did not observe this 
relationship when the faces shown were familiar. 
Cunningham, Raye and Johnson (2004) further 
investigated the relationship between implicit 
prejudice and amygdala activation to Whites’ 
responses to Black and White faces presented 
subliminally (30 ms exposure followed by a 
mask) and supraliminally (525 ms exposure). 
For the subliminal presentation of faces, there 
was greater amygdala activation when viewing 
Black faces than White faces. As in Phelps et 
al. (2000), this activation was correlated with 
IAT performance. For the supraliminal presen-
tation of faces, the procedure used in Phelps et 
al. (2000), there was no signifi cant differential 
activation of the amygdala. Only after ‘controlling 
for discrepancies between indirect and self-report 
measures’ (p. 811) did the IAT correlate with 
differential Black-White amygdala activity. 
In still another related experiment, Lieberman, 
Hariri, Jarcho, Eisenberger, and Bookheimer 
(2005) explored the amygdalar response to faces 
in both Black and White subjects. The authors 
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report greater amygdala activation across both 
White and Black participants when viewing Black 
faces compared to Whites faces. The researchers 
reached two conclusions. First, although the 
amygdala might respond to both threat and un-
familiarity, it cannot be responding due to 
unfamiliarity in this case, as Black participants 
are most likely more familiar with other Black 
faces, and still show greater amygdala activation 
to Black faces. Second, the researchers proposed 
that the amygdala is refl ecting cultural rather 
than individual patterns. That is, they posit that 
the amygdala reaction to faces is not based on an 
individual ingroup/outgroup basis, but rather 
on an approximation of the sum of the learned 
cultural messages about a given group. 
These results are, collectively, interesting and 
potentially valuable. The problem lies not in the 
quality of research itself, but in oversimplifi ed 
conclusions that people more distant from 
neuroscience often draw from research that is 
complex and technical. Moreover, it is often 
diffi cult for people outside of a fi eld to remain 
current with rapid developments in the area. 
For instance, whereas prior research implicated 
the amygdala as predominantly a ‘fear’ module, 
activated in response to threatening stimuli, 
more recent studies suggest the amygdala may 
be responsive to any attention-worthy stimuli, 
negative or positive, and may have a broader 
function of perceptual vigilance (see Phelps, 
2006). Furthermore, more recent neuroscientifi c 
work suggests that it may often be misleading 
to conceptualize neural responses as primarily 
localized in specifi c regions of the brain rather 
than considering the critical role of higher-order 
integrating pathways and connectivity systems 
in the brain. This may be a particular consider-
ation for social neuroscience studies, which 
often seek to investigate multiple psychological 
processes operating concurrently, as in the case 
of affect regulation (see Ochsner, 2007). 
Too narrow of a focus on intra-individual pro-
cesses can also lead researchers to ignore other, 
relevant social psychological explanations for 
the data. The social context and experimental 
cues in the studies of amygdala activation and 
implicit prejudice we have described likely 
alerted participants to the racially sensitive 
nature of the research. As a consequence, par-
ticipants, especially those who have racial biases, 
may be particularly vigilant for Blacks faces. It 
may be this heightened vigilance, rather than 
group-associated threat, that accounts for the 
correlation between implicit prejudice and 
amygdala activation. It is therefore important 
that social psychologists maintain a broad per-
spective rather than rush to judgment based on 
limited, and not always fully consistent, infor-
mation. We caution that ‘a little knowledge can 
be a dangerous thing’.
One may be tempted to ask whether the 
problem of oversimplifi ed conclusions is not 
simply one inherent with any cross-disciplinary 
work, where relative nonexpertise in some do-
mains may leave experts in another often reach-
ing ‘beyond the data’. From the social psy-
chologist’s perspective, what might be special 
about neuroimaging data, in particular, that 
might lead one to draw such conclusions? As 
others have cautioned (e.g. Ochsner, 2007), there 
is potential danger in drawing psychological 
inferences from functional neuroimaging 
data—invoking localized neural activity (or 
deactivations) as evidence of the invocation of 
particular psychological processes—and we 
briefl y highlight one particular concern that 
social psychologists should consider when 
developing and interpreting neuroimaging 
studies. 
Results of a recent meta-analytic investigation 
of neuroimaging fi ndings suggest that neuro-
imaging data often suffer from low consistency 
and may be particularly susceptible to false pos-
itives, given the often hundreds of thousands 
of comparisons involved in each study and the 
need to maintain statistical power with small 
samples (Wager, Lindquist, & Kaplan, 2007). 
Wager and colleagues estimated that as many 
as 10–20% of reported activations in published 
studies are false positives. With an ever growing 
body of findings and advancing statistical 
methods for analyzing such data in aggregated 
form, we suggest that such issues may be less a 
problem for neuroscience as it is for those in 
other disciplines tempted to use fi ndings from 
individual imaging studies to support claims of 
psychological processes. 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(2)
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As one example, considerable attention has 
recently been paid to exploring the functional 
neural architecture of affective response. A 
particular point of contention has been the 
relative absence of evidence for the localization 
of discrete emotional experience based on meta-
analytic reviews (for a review, see Barrett & Wager, 
2006). Individual studies, however, have shown 
substantial variation in localization of emotional 
states, providing researchers with a veritable 
database, although as of yet unsupported 
meta-analytically, of emotion-neural activation 
correspondence from which to substantiate 
claims of specifi city of emotional experience. 
This may be of particular importance in 
theories positing discrete systematic emotional 
experiences in the presence of particular out-
groups. Whereas the behavioral data are con-
vincing, one might consider the jury still out 
on neuroimaging data and avoid reliance on 
individual study fi ndings to instantiate and 
advance intergroup theories of emotion.
Practical considerations
Science is not value- or context-free. Pragmatic 
issues are typically of concern. In this section we 
consider two additional issues relating to the 
potential impact of social neuroscience on 
social psychology. Neither argument has the 
strength of systematic empirical evidence, but 
the potential effects are tangible. Both arguments 
concern the expense of fMRI research. 
Besides the expense of the fMRI equipment 
and its operation, access to the equipment can 
be quite costly (e.g. US $500 or more per hour). 
Even beyond the fi nancial constraints, many 
magnets are primarily reserved for clinical use, 
and time available for research is often quite 
limited. As a consequence of this restricted and 
costly access, researchers have less freedom to 
perform exploratory research, and when they 
do perform focused experiments, researchers 
often require a high level of certainty of achieving 
the predicted results before they initiate the 
study. A colleague who does fMRI research 
recently commented, ‘Before I give someone 
access to the magnet, they have to show me good 
behavioral evidence for the hypotheses’. This is 
a reasonable requirement from a neuroscience 
perspective, but once the persuasive behavioral 
evidence has been obtained, from a social psy-
chological perspective one might ask whether the 
neuroscience evidence is needed. Certainly, in 
many cases neuroscience data may provide add-
itional information that could not be gleaned 
from a purely behavioral study. However, the 
fact that practical constraints frequently orient 
researchers more toward confi rming existing 
social psychological theories and corroborating 
fi ndings with neuroimaging data than develop-
ing new theories can limit the contribution of 
neuroscience to social psychology. Further-
more, the expenses associated with imaging 
research often place constraints on study de-
signs, limiting the types of studies investigators 
can pursue. Most notably, this has led to an 
often necessary overreliance on within-subject 
designs for the use of smaller sample sizes and 
the incorporation of a more limited number 
of well-validated experimental paradigms. 
Indeed, the broad and varied nature of many 
social psychological studies may be seen as a 
particular strength of the fi eld, particularly for 
investigations of social interaction. 
Another practical issue related to the expense 
of fMRI research involves funding. Research 
using fMRI has captured the interest of govern-
ment officials and funding agencies across 
the world. It is a wonderful tool, and more re-
searchers are using it. Outside of psychology, 
neuroeconomics is a rapidly growing and valu-
able area of study with the potential to bring 
new insights into our understanding of inter-
group processes (Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, 
Treyer, & Fehr, 2006). We caution, however, that 
researchers, legislators, and funding agencies 
need to maintain a balance of support between 
behavioral (social science) research and medical, 
biological, and neuroscience research. 
Besides the long-term importance of pro-
moting new developments in all areas of science, 
there are immediate practical concerns as well. 
When the AIDS epidemic fi rst broke out, there 
was strong advocacy by the medical community 
that virtually all the government funding be 
directed toward a medical solution. There was 
optimism that with suffi cient resources AIDS 
could be cured or prevented through inoculation 
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in just a few years. The US government chose 
more balanced funding. 
It was a wise decision. Although medical re-
search has made impressive strides with drug 
treatments that extend the lives of HIV-positive 
individuals and greatly improved their quality of 
life, now, many years later, there is still no cure. 
Ironically, without the funding that has sup-
ported behavioral interventions to promote 
safe sexual practices to limit the spread of HIV 
(Fisher, Fisher, Amico, & Harmon, 2006), the 
medical advances in this area might have greatly 
increased the spread of AIDS. More people liv-
ing normal lives with HIV would increase the 
likelihood that HIV could be transmitted to 
larger populations. The behavioral research 
and the interventions that have resulted have 
thus complemented the medical research in 
ways with invaluable benefi ts to individuals 
and society. 
Promise of social neuroscience for 
social psychology
In the previous section, we presented a contrary 
view of the impact of social neuroscience on 
social psychology. We did so not simply to play 
the role of devil’s advocate, but also out of some 
genuine concerns for the fi eld and its future. In 
this section, we offer balance by highlighting 
the positive implications and reasons why social 
psychology should embrace social neuroscience. 
Paralleling the section on concerns, we highlight 
theoretical, empirical, and practical reasons, but 
in the reverse order, with practical considerations 
fi rst. 
Practical considerations 
In the last section, we emphasized the question 
of what value neuroscience is to social psycho-
logy. Our analysis suggested that, at least at the 
present time, social neuroscience may often be 
of more scientifi c interest, both theoretically 
and empirically, to neuroscientists than it is to 
social psychologists, particularly those studying 
group processes and intergroup relations. 
Nevertheless, we contend that such a parochial 
view of social psychology is not in the fi eld’s 
long-term best interest. 
Besides missed opportunities for funding, 
some of the most important and exciting new 
discoveries are at the boundaries of traditional 
disciplines and at mutlidisciplinary intersec-
tions. Prejudice is a good case study. Prejudice is 
infl uenced by processes at many different levels: 
cultural, historical, institutional, intergroup, 
interpersonal, and intra-individual. Moreover, 
these forces can operate separately or in concert, 
with processes at one level infl uencing processes 
at another level or with processes at different 
levels operating simultaneously to shape people’s 
immediate behaviors. 
For instance, both sociologists and social 
psychologists have long proposed that group 
competition and threat are fundamental pro-
cesses in the development and maintenance 
of prejudice. The different disciplinary ap-
proaches have recently been integrated into 
more comprehensive theories, such as realistic 
group confl ict theory (Bobo, 1999). In addition, 
whereas sociology’s concern with competition 
for resources has informed social psychological 
theory of intergroup relations, social psych-
ology’s recognition of less tangible sources of 
group confl ict, such as needs for collective esteem 
and reduction of uncertainty, has offered a dif-
ferent perspective on prejudice to sociology. 
A group-level analysis of prejudice also helps 
to bridge research in social psychology to work 
in political science. Social dominance theory 
(Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) emerged, in part, 
from investigations in the subdiscipline of 
political psychology, which has roots in both 
psychology and political science. According to 
social dominance theory, across cultures and 
history, complex human societies have organized 
themselves into group-based hierarchies. Dom-
inant groups are motivated to maintain their 
privileged position, and they reinforce social 
stratifi cation through structural factors (e.g. 
social or institutional policies) and psychological 
factors (e.g. the justifi cation of prejudice). Thus, 
because of its function in reinforcing a dominant 
group’s status, prejudice is ubiquitous, although 
its nature and its targets may differ from culture 
to culture and time to time. 
An appreciation of the interplay of forces at 
different levels, not simply their independent 
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effects, also promises signifi cant new advances 
in developing a comprehensive understanding 
of prejudice. For example, although researchers 
gained many insights into within-individual 
processes of stereotyping and prejudice stemm-
ing from social-cognitive approaches that dom-
inated social psychology in the 1970s and 1980s, 
the growing use of dyadic- and group-level 
analysis in more recent decades has brought 
with it new questions to the study of intergroup 
relations research. Among these have been new 
understandings of the experiential and per-
ceptual dynamics of intergroup contact and 
a broader understanding of the maintenance 
of system-level forces, such as institutional dis-
crimination (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). 
Although the interdisciplinary connections 
in the study of the social psychology of prejudice 
have traditionally been directed toward more 
molar levels of analysis, they may now be orien-
ting toward more molecular levels of analysis. 
Within social psychology, for example, a variety 
of different operationalizations (such as sex, 
race, and painting preference) have been used 
to study ingroup–outgroup relations. In add-
ition, certain social categories, specifi cally sex, 
race, and age, have been identifi ed as particu-
larly salient dimensions that are encoded in an 
automatic and mandatory manner. Cosmides, 
Tooby, and Kurzban (2003) observed, ‘Such 
results led some to propose that race, sex, and 
age are “primary” or “primitive” dimensions of 
person perception … built into our cognitive 
architecture’ (p. 174). Thus, the behavioral 
evidence has suggested that sexism and racism 
(and ageism) have common cognitive bases. 
Neuroscience research, however, has revealed 
that sex and race activate different brain struc-
tures. Whereas racial categorization relates to 
general structures that have evolved for sensitivity 
to novelty or threat (amygdala) and neural 
systems that have evolved for tracking coalitions 
and alliances (Cosmides et al., 2003), sex and 
age are encoded in regions of the brain (fronto-
central regions) that are not only different from 
the areas of activity associated with race but 
also distinct from those areas activated gener-
ally by visual analysis of faces (Mouchetant-
Rostaing & Giard, 2003). Cosmides et al. (2003) 
argue that different patterns of brain activity 
associated with perceptions of race and gender 
are the consequence of very different evolution-
ary infl uences. 
We note, however, that the data on this issue 
are far from conclusive; the Mouchetant-Rostaing 
and Giard (2003) research, for instance, did 
not assess subcortical (e.g. amygdala) activ-
ation, and amygdala activation cannot be taken 
as prima facie evidence for an innate, hard-wired 
basis for group perception, given that it responds 
to many other features of a particular context. 
Nevertheless, Cosmides et al.’s (2003) arguments, 
which have some tentative neuroscience sup-
port, are provocative and can stimulate further 
research exploring whether there are funda-
mental differences in the way the behaviorally 
primary categories of race, sex, and age are 
perceived and encoded. Taking advantage of 
the new ideas and techniques currently offered 
by social neuroscience thus opens new doors, 
not just to funding, but to scientifi c discovery.
Empirical considerations
Besides the broad promise of social neuro-
science for future advances in social psychology, 
neuroscience can be particularly valuable by 
offering techniques to assess mechanisms that 
have been hypothesized in social psychological 
theory but are diffi cult to measure directly with 
conventional social psychological techniques 
(see also Harmon-Jones & Devine, 2003). 
Indeed, there is concrete evidence of the value 
of incorporating lower level process measures, 
such as those used in social neuroscience and 
psychophysiological research, to understanding 
processes hypothesized to be central to inter-
group relations. Although the present analysis 
has up to this point focused on measures of 
central nervous system activity (e.g. fMRI), we 
briefl y turn to evidence examining peripheral 
nervous system activity to illustrate our point.
One of the key explanatory concepts in Social 
Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) has been 
the construct of identity threat. Although a variety 
of forms of group threat, such as realistic and 
symbolic group threat, have proven amenable 
to direct self-report measures (Riek, Mania, & 
Gaertner, 2006), there are few effective direct 
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measures of social identity threat. Scheepers 
and Ellemers (2005) observed, ‘Although the 
phenomenon has been proposed to account 
for a variety of more manifest responses to 
group status, social identity threat has not 
been actually assessed. Instead, threat has often 
been inferred from one of its assumed conse-
quences, like derogation of an out-group’ (p. 192). 
Instead, Scheepers and Ellemers applied a 
physiological measure, blood pressure, to study 
the occurrence of social identity threat. Blood 
pressure demonstrated a pattern of results 
consistent with predictions about experiences 
of identity threat derived from Social Identity 
Theory, whereas direct self-report measures 
of threat did not. Thus, psychophysiological 
responses may capture the essence of social 
identity threat in ways that self-reports can not 
(see also Gugliemi, 1999).
Although Social Identity Theory has empha-
sized the role of intergroup threat, which may 
be effectively indexed by cardiovascular response, 
other approaches to intergroup relations em-
phasize the role of cognitive representations 
of the self, others, and groups as a fundamental 
determinant of intergroup relations. Self-
Categorization Theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, & Wethere II, 1987) posits that when 
social identity is salient, ‘people come to perceive 
themselves more as interchangeable exemplars 
of a social category’ (Turner et al., 1987, p. 50). 
The Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner 
& Dovidio, 2000) hypothesizes that when people 
categorize others within a common collective 
identity the psychological distance is reduced 
between the self and others, and cognitive repre-
sentations of the self and the ingroup become 
directly linked (Smith & Henry, 1996). This 
emphasis on cognitive processes in intergroup 
relations draws attention to potential underlying 
neural processes.
Beyond the historical use of psychophysio-
logical measures as alternatives to self-report, 
these theories of cognitive representations 
could benefi t directly from neuroscience theory 
and techniques. In many current self-report 
measures of representations, such as the Inclu-
sion of Others in the Self Scale (see Aron et al., 
2004), in which greater overlap between two 
circles represents greater inclusion, it is not 
clear whether the overlap represents the self 
becoming identifi ed with another or another 
becoming incorporated into the self. Although 
preliminary, recent neuroscience fi ndings may 
offer some insight: Medial prefrontal cortical 
activity (Heatherton, Wyland, & Macrae, 2006), 
specifi cally in the ventral and dorsal regions 
(D’Argembeau, Ruby, & Collette, 2007), appears 
to relate uniquely to judgments of the self and 
self-referential processes, and the mentalizing 
of others, respectively (see also Harris & Fiske, 
2006; Johnson et al., 2006; Mitchell, Macrae, & 
Banaji, 2006). The distinction about whether 
another person becomes incorporated within 
the self or becomes closer but remains distinct 
upon categorization within the same group is 
theoretically important in identity theories of 
intergroup relations. Social neuroscience may 
offer new ways of understanding and testing 
these effects empirically. 
Additionally, neuroscience data can provide 
information to constrain theories in a way that 
behavioral data alone cannot. Imaging data 
are particularly valuable in detailing insights 
into how and when processes occur, helping to 
establish the similarity or dissociability of psy-
chological mechanisms. Of particular interest 
to intergroup relations researchers, a consistent 
picture appears to be emerging regarding pat-
terns of neural activation associated with more 
automatic versus controlled processing. Whereas 
controlled forms of social cognition have been 
consistently associated with activations in an 
identifiable system of brain structures (the 
‘C-system’; e.g. lateral prefrontal cortex), at pre-
sent automatic forms have consistently been 
associated with activations in other structures 
(the ‘X-system’; e.g. amygdala and lateral tem-
poral cortex) (Lieberman, 2007). With regard 
to this pattern, Lieberman (2007) has recently 
suggested that this classic dichotomy may 
indeed refl ect a ‘core-processing’ distinction 
within social cognitive neuroscience, that, in 
the future, might be used to identify automatic 
versus controlled processing in social psych-
ological tasks without the need for subliminal 
presentations or cognitive load. The prospect 
of drawing such psychological inferences from 
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functional imaging data brings with it the 
potential to substantiate theoretical claims and 
breed new insights into the recruitment and 
interplay of these and other ‘core processes’ 
suggested by neuroscience data, some of 
which may not yet be implicated in social 
psychological theory (see Lieberman, 2007, 
for an overview).
Theoretical considerations
The most significant contributions offered 
by social neuroscience are new theoretical 
perspectives. We discussed the general value 
of multidisciplinary perspectives in a previous 
section; in this section we consider specifi c 
applications. We offer two examples from the 
study of intergroup bias. One focuses on under-
standing the role of activation of intergroup 
biases and implicit attitudes. The other con-
cerns the distinction between prejudice and 
stereotypes.
In 1996, Bargh published his highly infl u-
ential chapter describing the activation of cog-
nitive concepts, such as stereotypes and prejudice, 
as a ‘cognitive monster’ that pervasively, and 
perhaps inevitably, infl uences perceptions and 
action (see also Bargh & Williams, 2006). It is 
important to consider, however, whether and 
how conscious processes and motivations might 
be able to inhibit or suppress implicit attitudes 
and stereotypes, once activated. Recent research 
from cognitive neuroscience offers some ideas 
about this possibility. 
Although evidence of direct pathways is scant, 
there is some evidence that the prefrontal cortex, 
which is frequently implicated in controlled 
processing, can modulate amygdala activation 
(Grace & Rosenkranz, 2002), including, as we 
described earlier, activation associated with 
racial bias (Phelps et al., 2000). Studies using 
fMRI have recently demonstrated that emo-
tion reappraisal—reinterpreting emotion-
eliciting stimuli in a way that reduces emotional 
responding—recruits prefrontal systems impli-
cated in other forms of cognitive control (e.g. 
working memory), and is dependent upon 
interactions between prefrontal and cingulate 
executive control systems and cortical and sub-
cortical emotion-generative systems (Ochsner & 
Gross, 2005). In particular, reappraisal of negat-
ive emotion has been shown to activate dorsal 
anterior cingulate cortex and prefrontal cortex 
systems that support the selection and application 
of reappraisal strategies and modulate activity 
in low-level emotion processing systems, such as 
the amygdala or insula, in accordance with the 
goal of the appraisal (Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & 
Gabrieli, 2002; Ochsner & Gross, 2005). 
In addition, although not concretely showing 
the operation of a direct inhibiting pathway, 
research in social neuroscience has revealed 
that ‘explicit and implicit evaluations (good-
bad) involve somewhat different neural circuits’ 
(Cunningham, Raye, & Johnson, 2004, p. 1717). 
In particular, Cunningham, Raye et al. (2004) 
found that the mere exposure to an attitude 
object even when participants were not asked 
to evaluate the object (conditions of implicit 
evaluation), elicited amygdala activation, 
which was correlated with emotional intensity 
of evaluative response. In contrast, when the 
task involved explicit evaluation, activation 
occurred primarily in the areas in the frontal 
cortex rather than in the amygdala. Thus, ‘hard-
wiring’ in the brain suggests that it is possible to 
tame the cognitive monster through conscious 
cognitive control.
Moreover, social neuroscience can help pro-
mote theoretical development by identifying 
basic differences in neural activity that more 
clearly distinguish different types of processes, 
such as decision making and facial recognition, 
that may be less discernible at the level of overt 
behavior. For instance, Ermer, Guerin, Cosmides, 
Tooby, and Miller (2006) found evidence in 
an fMRI study that social exchange behavior 
may be regulated by a functionally specialized 
system associated with brain regions (anterior 
and posterior temporal cortex) that are not 
activated by other types of reasoning. Golby, 
Gabrieli, Chiao, and Eberhardt (2001) found 
evidence of differential activation in fusiform 
regions in response to same- and different-race 
face recognition that directly relates to the 
general behavioral fi nding that people tend 
to show superior memory for faces of people 
from their own race relative to another race. 
These insights are complementary to those 
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of traditional mainstream social psychology, 
but they offer additional value by illuminating 
distinct dynamic underpinnings of intragroup 
and intergroup processes. 
Social neuroscience has already contributed 
to theoretical refi nements of traditionally funda-
mental social psychological concepts, such as 
prejudice and stereotyping. Conceptually, pre-
judice and stereotypes have been considered 
as distinct phenomena: prejudice is a general 
evaluative bias, whereas stereotypes are semantic 
associations (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & 
Gaertner, 1996). In practice, though, prejudice 
and stereotyping are often confl ated as elements 
of intergroup bias, both practically, as often 
measured in our studies, as well as in our theor-
izing. Nevertheless, empirically, Dovidio et al. 
(1996) found in a meta-analytic review of the 
literature that individual differences in pre-
judice and stereotype endorsement were only 
modestly related (r = .25).
From a social neuroscience perspective, the 
work of Amodio and colleagues (2007; Amodio & 
Devine, 2006; Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-
Jones, 2007) offers theoretical insights into 
why prejudice and stereotyping are only mod-
erately related and how they represent distinct 
processes. Of particular importance to their 
theorizing, Squire and Knowlton’s (1994) 
neuroscience model of memory identifi es two 
types of memory systems: declarative and non-
declarative. Declarative memory, which explicitly 
links facts and events, is associated with medial 
temporal lobe (hippocampus) activity. There 
are four elements of nondeclarative memory: 
(a) procedural, relating to skills and habits 
(associated with the striatum); (b) priming 
(neocortex); (c) simple classical conditioning, 
related to emotional responses (amygdala) 
and skeletalmusculature (cerebellum); and 
(d) nonassociative learning (refl ex pathways). 
As an association between specifi c semantic 
concepts, stereotyping would theoretically fall 
into one type of nondeclarative memory, one 
related to priming. Prejudice, however, consist-
ing of automatic emotional responses is related 
to another element of nondeclarative memory 
in Squire and Knowlton’s framework, one refl ect-
ing classical conditioning. 
Highlighting this neuroscience perspective, 
Amodio and Devine (2006) explained how 
prejudice and stereotyping may rely on funda-
mentally different neural mechanisms. Amodio 
and Devine wrote, ‘An examination of anat-
omical and neurochemical connectivity of the 
amygdala and surrounding structures reveals 
strong direct links with neural regions associated 
with … mobilizing fi ght or fl ight responses…. 
By contrast, … semantic associations are likely 
embedded in distributed networks in association 
cortex and thus may infl uence social cognition 
by biasing higher order information processing, 
such as when inferring the beliefs and inten-
tions of another person’ (p. 653). In this case, 
an existing neuroscience model (and one that 
focuses on memory systems that have been well-
supported empirically within neuroscience; 
see Ochsner, 2007) provides new insights into 
an important distinction in social psychology, 
between prejudice and stereotyping: ‘Although 
systems for affect- and semantic-based associ-
ations typically function in concert, and thus 
tend to appear blended in outward verbal and 
behavioral responses, a consideration of their 
distinct operations is critical for understanding 
the behavioral effects of implicit stereotyping 
and evaluation’ (p. 653). In an elegant series of 
studies using only behavioral measures (response 
time measures, self-reports, and seating distance), 
Amodio and Devine demonstrated the cognitive 
and behavioral independence of prejudice and 
stereotyping. 
Conclusion
There is a clearly burgeoning literature con-
sidering fundamental linkages between neuro-
science and social psychology. The field of 
social neuroscience is rapidly evolving in its 
science and identity. Nevertheless, despite the 
exponential growth in this line of inquiry, pub-
lications on this topic remain sparse in main-
stream social psychology journals. In addition, 
whereas neuroscience and the information-
processing approach of social cognition appear 
complementary and well-suited to an integrated 
framework, the connection to higher-level 
concepts in the study of group process, identity, 
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and intergroup relations is much less well 
established.
In this article, we presented a number of 
caveats about the value of social neuroscience 
for studying group-level phenomena. We be-
lieve that these are legitimate concerns, but 
they are not insurmountable. Moreover, we con-
tend that there are signifi cant benefi ts to having 
an even broader multidisciplinary orientation 
within social psychology, one that incorporates 
the perspectives, techniques, and knowledge 
of neuroscience. Although not all group phe-
nomena can be reduced to neural substrates, 
social neuroscience needs to be recognized as 
providing an important complementary per-
spective with the potential to advance the study 
of intergroup phenomena by providing non-
overlapping insights one cannot glean from 
behavioral data alone. 
The challenge for the near future is not for 
promoting social neuroscience research; social 
neuroscience is doing quite well on its own. The 
real challenge is fi nding ways for mainstream 
social psychology, and its publication arms, 
not simply to understand and appreciate social 
neuroscience but to bring it more to the center 
of the fi eld. Situating social neuroscience nearer 
to the center of social psychology will help bring 
its ideas and insights to the consciousness of 
even researchers who have no interest in using 
fMRI, event related potential, or other psycho-
physiological techniques and stimulate cre-
ativity among those whose interests reside pri-
marily at molar levels of analysis.
In the near term, the areas of social neuro-
science and group processes are likely to continue 
to be somewhat strange bedfellows. We are still 
at the ‘dating’ stage, with appropriate wariness. 
Neuroscientists and traditionally trained social 
psychologists sometimes collaborate on prob-
lems of mutual interest. Sometimes these rela-
tionships are transient, other times more enduring. 
In the longer term, though, there is a newer gen-
eration of professionals who are being jointly 
trained in social psychology and neuroscience 
and who see the intimate connections across 
these areas at the most basic level of their theor-
etical analysis. This true integration of perspect-
ives promises a long and healthy marriage that 
is balanced in its contribution to neuroscience 
and social psychology and offers genuinely 
comprehensive theories of complex social 
behavior.
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